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Rose v. Lee
252 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2001)
L Fas
A North Carolina jury convicted John Hardy Rose ("Rose") of capital
murder for the murder of Patricia Stewart. The jury chose to sentence Rose to
death. On May 12, 1992, Rose appealed to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, which unanimously found no error in Rose's conviction or death
sentence. After being denied certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Rose
filed a petition for state habeas corpus relief, which is termed a Motion for
Appropriate Relief ("MAR") in North Carolina. After holding an evidentiary
hearing, the MAR court denied Rose's request of relief. Rose then petitioned
the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina for
habeas relief. The petition was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge, who
recommended to the district court to dismiss on summary judgment all but the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. After a de novo review, the district court
agreed with the magistrate judge's recommendation and issued a writ of habeas
corpus with respect to Rose's ineffective assistance of counsel claim but dismissed on all of Rose's other claims. The district court then remanded the
ineffective assistance claim to the state court.'
Rose then sought appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Crcuit on three issues: (1)whether his confession was illegally obtained,
(2)whether the imposition of the death penalty in North Carolina unconstitutionallydiscriminates against the impoverished; and (3)whether the ex post facto
clause bars the application of North Carolina General Statutes Section 15A-1419
to his habeas petition. The State then cross appealed claiming that the district
court had erred by remanding the ineffective assistance claim to the MAR court

for application of the proper legal standard.2

II. Hddin
The Fourth Grcuit reversed the portion of the district court's judgment
granting the writ of habeas corpus as to the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.3 The court affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment in
favor of the State, and declined to grant Rose a certificate of appealability.4
1.

Rose v. Lee, 252 F3d 676,682-83 (4th Car. 2001).

2.
3.

Idat 683.
Idat 681.

4.

Id
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III. A mlysis /Aplicaw
i Vvg
A. Ex PostFacto
Rose filed his MAR on October 4, 1995? On June 21, 1996, the North
Carolina legislature amended North Carolina General Statutes Section 15A- 1419,
which addresses default of claims on state collateral review.6 This amendment
made procedural bars mandatory rather than discretionaryunless the petitioner
can establish good cause or that the failure to consider the claim will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.7 The MAR court applied the amended
statutory language to several of Rose's claims and determined that the claims
were procedurallybarred Rose argued that this application of Section 15A- 1419
as amended violated the ExPost Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.9
The district court rejected Rose's claim on the merits, forcing Rose to
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of
the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.'0 Retroactive application of a
procedural law can violate the Ex Post Facto Cause, but only when the law.
(1) punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; (2) makes more burdensome the punishment for a
crime, after it' s commission; (3) deprives one charged with crime of
any defense that was available according to law at the time when the
act was committed, or (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender."
5.
6.

Id. at 683.
Id;seN.C GEN.STAT.S 15A- 1419 (1999 &Supp. 2000). Section 15A- 1419(b) amended

the language as follows:
(b) The court shad

the motion under any of the circumstances specified in this

siction, unless the defendant can demonstrate:
(1) Good cause for excusing the grounds for denial listed in subsection (a) of this
section and can demonstrate aualprejudice resulting from the defendant's cdai, or
(2) That failure to consider the defendit's claim wilfresult in a fundaental miscariage of justice.
Id The statute previously read:
(b)Although the court maydenythe motion under anyof the circumstances specified
in this section, in the interest of justice and for good cause shown it mayin its discretion grant the motion if it is otherwise meritorious.

N.C GEN. STAT. S 15A-1419 (1978).
7. Rco4 252 F3d at 683; swS 15A- 1419; s
note 6.
8. Ra4e 252 F.3d at 683.
9. Id; s aho US. GO)NT. art. I, S 9, cL 3.
10. Rrze, 252 F.3d at 683-684; see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 US. 473, 484 (2000) (holding that
denial of a habeas petition on procedural grounds requires that the prisoner show, at least, that
jurists would find district court's assessment of constitutional claims debatable or wrong).

11.

Rcse, 252 F.3d at 684 (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 US. 37,42 (1990) and Carmell

v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 551 (2000)).
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The Fourth Crcuit found that the application of the amended language of
Section 15A-1419 did not fall into any of the four categories. 2 The Fourth
Crcuit found Rose's ex post facto claim was barred." The court noted that the
United States Supreme Court has held that a law does not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause simply because it "alters the situation of a party to his disadvan-

tage."' 4

B. PwiaayDfau"raiIi

1.Rze's Cafsion
Rose sought appeal on several claims that the district court found to be
procedurally defaulted. In order to secure a certificate of appealabilityRose had
to demonstrate both (1)"that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right' and (2) 'that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.' ' "
Rose sought to appeal the district court's denial of his claim that his confession was unconstitutionallycompelled with a promise of life imprisonment and
then used to secure his death sentence.' 6 It was acknowledged byRose's attorney
that this claim was not premised upon a Miranda violation but rather upon a
promise having been made in exchange for Rose's confession."7 Relying on
Arizon v Fubniman," the Fourth Circuit applied the "totality of the circumstances" standard to Rose's claim that his confession was unconstitutionally
forced.'9 The United States Supreme Court in Fulniwae ruled that the existence
of a promise in connection with a confession does not render a confession per
se involuntary." The Fourth Carcuit therefore declined to hold that the cryptic
promise that "things would go easier" on Rose if he confessed amounted to
12.
13.

Id
Id

14.

Id; see Cdiv, 497 US. at 48-50 (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated

simply because the party's situation is altered to his disadvantage).
15.
Rae, 252 F.3d at 684 (quoting Sad, 529 US. at 484). SwgurnyBeck v. Angelone, 261
F.3d 377, 392 (4th CAr. 2001) (holding that Beck was not entitled to certificate of appealability
because he failed to establish a valid constitutional claim, the court therefore refused to address the
procedural question); Damien P. DeLaney, Case Note, 14 CAP. DEF.J. 119 (2001) (analyzing Beck

v. Angelone, 261 FM 377 (4th Cir. 2001)) (stating that the Fourth CArcuit ruired that both prongs
of the S/ade standard be met in order to secure a certificate of appealability).
16. Rce 252 F.3d at 685.
17. Id

18. 499 US. 279 (1991).
19. Rase,252F.3d at685;seeArizonav. Fulminante, 499 US. 279,285-86 (1991) (holdingthat
deternitiation regarding the voluntariness of a confession must be viewed in totality of the
circunistances).
20.

Fgdniaxt 499 U.S. at 285.
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unconstitutional coercion."1 The court denied the claim without ever addressing
the second prong of the appealability test because the claim failed to meet the
first prong of the test.
2. Disarit m CaiM
Rose next sought to appeal the district court's denial of his claim that North
Carolina unconstitutionally discriminates based upon economics in the imposition of the death penalty. The district court declined to address the merits of
Rose's economic discrimination claim because Rose failed to "fairlypresent" the
issue to the state courts, so the issue was therefore procedurally barred.24 Rose
argued to the Fourth Caruit that he had established sufficient cause to overcome
the procedural default of his claim, because the facts to support the claim were
not readily available to Rose's counsel during the state proceedings." While the
court acknowledged that a petitioner can establish cause by showing that the
factual information was unavailable, the court did not believe that the factual
information was unavailable to Rose.26
C IrffeiwAssista jfCaMd
The State argued that the district court erred by granting a writ of habeas
corpus with respect to Rose's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.27 The
district court held that the MAR court acted contraryto dearly established law
when it denied Rose's ineffective assistance of counsel claim; the error was in
applying the wrong burden of proof." The MAR court ruled that Rose had
failed to show bypreponderance of the evidence that the result of the proceeding
would have been different but for the ineffective assistance of counsel 9 However, the United States Supreme Court held in Sctridiv Washvt
that the
prisoner need only demonstrate areasonable probability that the result would
have been different. 1 The Fourth Crcuit agreed with the district court that the
decision making process bywhich the MAR court adjudicated Rose's ineffective

21.
22.
23.

Rcse 252 F.3d at 686.
Id at 686 n.7.
Id at 686-87.

24.

Idat 687.

25.

Id

26.
27.

Id
Idat 688.

28.
29.

Id
Id at 689.

30. 466 US. 668 (1984).
31. Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668,694 (1984) (holding that a reasonabe probabiity
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome).
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assistance 32of counsel claim was contrary to dearly established Supreme Court
precedent.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court about whether the
district court must remand the case to the MAR court or whether the district
court could review the case de novo." The Fourth Crcuit did not read l/iam
v Ta)W4 as barring the district court's de novo review of Rose's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim" s In Wilm the United States Supreme Court found
that the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel
failed to introduce substantial mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury? The
Court ruled that Stridkkanprovides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all
ineffective assistance claims. 7 When a state court makes a ruling that is clearly
contraryto established federal law, the federal courts have an obligation to review
state court judgments independentlyto determine whether issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus is warranted. 8 However, instead of remanding the case back to
the district court for determination on whether the writ should have been issued,
the Fourth Curuit chose to issue its own decision.
It is interesting to note that the court denied certificate of appealability, yet
also decided that the district court was correct and that jurists of reason could
not disagree. If the court rules that it has no jurisdiction, it is difficult to understand how it then can decide the case on the merits. Also, it is unclear from the
opinion's use of the word "our" when stating the duty of federal habeas courts
to review state habeas court's rulings. 9 Does "our" pertain to the district courts
or the Fourth Crcuit? If the court has granted this de novo review power to
itself, where does the court find authority for this proposition? After conducting de novo review, the Fourth Crcuit reversed the district court's issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus on Rose's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.4
Cynthia M Bruce

32. Rme, 252 F.3d at 689.
33. Id at 689-690.
34. 529 US. 362 (2000).
35. Rae, 252 F.3d at 689; se Williams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362, 389 (2000) (holding that a
federal court may review de novo claims of ineffective assistance of counseD.
36.
WMdim, 529 US. at 399.
37. Id at 391.
38. RA%4 252 F.3d at 690.
39. Id at 689.
40. Id at 695.

